The Washington Post
March 11, 1992, Wednesday, Final Edition
SECTION: FIRST SECTION; PAGE A1
LENGTH: 1632 words
HEADLINE: Keeping the U.S. First;
Pentagon Would Preclude a Rival Superpower
BYLINE: Barton Gellman, Washington Post Staff Writer
BODY:
In a classified blueprint intended to help "set the nation's direction for
the next century," the Defense Department calls for concerted efforts to
preserve American global military supremacy and to thwart the emergence of a
rival superpower in Europe, Asia or the former Soviet Union. The 46-page memorandum describes itself as "definitive guidance from the
Secretary of Defense" for preparation of defense budgets for fiscal 1994 through
1999. It defies the predictions of some outside analysts that the Pentagon would
relax resistance to further budget cuts after the turmoil of the election year.
Instead it mounts a detailed argument for maintaining the current "base
force" of 1.6 million active-duty troops to the end of the decade and beyond.
Though noting that "the passing of the Cold War reduces pressure for U.S.
military involvement in every potential regional or local conflict," the
document argues not only for preserving but expanding the most demanding
American commitments and for resisting efforts by key allies to provide their
own security.
In particular, the document raises the prospects of "a unilateral U.S.
defense guarantee" to Eastern Europe, "preferably in cooperation with other NATO
states," and contemplates use of American military power to preempt or punish
use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, "even in conflicts that
otherwise do not directly engage U.S. interests."
The memo was drafted under supervision of Paul Wolfowitz, undersecretary
for policy. Although it is not supplied to Congress and was not intended for public release, the document represents a response at the highest levels of the
Pentagon to a growing call in the American political debate for retrenchment
from commitments abroad. First reported Sunday in the New York Times, it
provides the rationale for U.S. involvement around the world as "a constant
fixture" in an era of fundamental change.
The central strategy of the Pentagon framework is to "establish and protect a
new order" that accounts "sufficiently for the interests of the advanced
industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership," while at
the same time maintaining a military dominance capable of "deterring potential
competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role."
"While the U.S. cannot become the world's 'policeman,' by assuming
responsibility for righting every wrong, we will retain the preeminent
responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only
our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously
unsettle international relations," the document states.
Much of the document parallels the extensive public statements of Defense
Secretary Richard B. Cheney and Gen. Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Believing this year's defense debate is a pivotal moment in development of a
post-Cold War security framework, the two men have given unusually detailed
briefings to Congress of the rationale for the force they designed after
collapse of the Warsaw Pact in late 1989.
Like their public statements, the classified memo emphasizes the virtues of
collective action and the central U.S. interest in promoting increased respect
for international law and "the spread of democratic forms of government and open
economic systems."
Also like their public statements, the document describes a reorientation of
U.S. defenses away from the threat of global war with the former Soviet Union
and toward potential regional conflicts.
But the new memo gives central billing to U.S. efforts to prevent emergence
of a rival superpower, a diplomatically sensitive subject that has not been
prominent in public debate.
That objective, the document states, "is a dominant consideration underlying
the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any
hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated
control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union and Southwest Asia."
Distributed Feb. 18 to military service chiefs and secretaries, the
commanders in chief of worldwide military theaters and other top Pentagon
officials, the memorandum is a nearly final draft of this year's long overdue
" Defense Planning Guidance," the defense secretary's cornerstone statement of
policy and strategy.
Senior officials said the document has not been given final approval by
Wolfowitz or Cheney.
But they acknowledged that both had played substantial roles in the
document's creation and endorsed its principal views. "This is not the piano
player in the whorehouse," one official said.
The policy plan restates support for a set of seven classified scenarios
prepared by the Pentagon describing hypothetical roads to war by the end of the
century. Those scenarios, reported late last month by the New York Times and
Washington Post, included an American-led defense of Lithuania and Poland from
invasion by Russia, wars against Iraq and North Korea to repel attacks on their
southern neighbors and smaller-scale interventions in Panama and the
Philippines. The scenarios came under congressional attack by political figures in both
parties, and senior defense officials then suggested that they might be revised
or abandoned.
Air Force Secretary Donald B. Rice, for example, said in an interview that
the scenario set "was a staff product. It was just about to be circulated for
higher level review, and it could have benefited from that review."
The new document, by contrast, directs military services and defense agencies
to measure their purchasing and training decisions against the requirements of
the war scenarios.
The services are told, for example, to buy enough "threat-oriented munitions"
-- such as missiles, bombs and artillery shells -- to provide 80 percent
confidence that they would destroy 80 percent of the expected targets "in the
two most demanding Major Regional Conflict scenarios."
Among Democrats on Capitol Hill, the policy memorandum has already come under
bitter attack. Sen. Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.), an advocate of deep cuts in
defense spending to pay for domestic needs, called the Pentagon strategy
"myopic, shallow and disappointing." "The basic thrust of the document seems to be this: We love being the sole remaining superpower in the world and we want so much to remain that way that we are willing to put at risk the basic health of our economy and well-being of our people to do so," he said.
Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.), attacking what he said was the document's
emphasis on unilateral action, ridiculed it as "literally a Pax Americana. . . .
It won't work. You can be the world superpower and still be unable to maintain
peace throughout the world."
Senior Pentagon officials angrily disputed the charge, first made in Sunday's
New York Times, that the new strategy was "the clearest rejection to date of
collective internationalism."
They cited the document's pledge, on its first page, to "continue to support
and protect those bilateral, multilateral, international or regionally based
institutions, processes and relationships which afford us opportunities to share
responsibility for global and regional security."
"What is just dead wrong is this notion of a sole superpower dominating the
rest of the world," a ranking defense official said. "The main thrust of what
the secretary has to say and what that draft also says is that the key to maintaining the rather benign environment we have today is sustaining the
democratic alliances we've shaped over 40 years."
Harold Brown, a former defense secretary, agreed in an interview yesterday
that there is no contradiction between collective security and desirability of
maintaining the United States as the world's strongest military power.
"Take the Persian Gulf situation," he said. "That was clearly a collective
security arrangement but it clearly wouldn't have happened if the U.S. hadn't
taken the lion's share, by which I mean almost all, of the military burden. That
is a demonstration of how you can have both at the same time."
Academic criticism of the new strategy centered, by contrast, on its
treatment of Russia. Michael Mandelbaum, a foreign policy analyst at Johns
Hopkins University, argued that the logic of preventing reemergence of a hostile
superpower suggests "far greater involvement in the economy and democratization
of the Russians and the Ukrainians."
But in the current political debate, he said, "giving them money seems to be
a taboo word." Cheney has spoken in glowing terms of potential U.S.-Russian friendship "if democracy matures," even suggesting the possibility of combined military action
against regional aggressors.
But he has also expressed skepticism that the United States or Western Europe
possesses any great influence over Russia's internal development.
The new strategy describes a delicate balance between supporting the former
Soviet republics "in their efforts to become peaceful democracies with market
based economies" and the need to "hedge against the possibility that democracy
will fail."
"Our strategic challenge," the memo states, "is to construct the security
hedges against democratic failure in such a way that we do not . . . increase
the likelihood of a democratic failure."
In that context, Brown and others also criticized the document's suggestion
that the United States or NATO might extend security guarantees to Eastern
Europe, describing it as provocative of Russian nationalism and ignoring "the
same grave danger of nuclear war" that prevented Western intervention there for
45 years.
The New York Times
May 24, 1992, Sunday, Late Edition - Final
SECTION: Section 1; Page 1; Column 4; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 1660 words
HEADLINE: PENTAGON DROPS GOAL OF BLOCKING NEW SUPERPOWERS
BYLINE: By PATRICK E. TYLER, Special to The New York Times
DATELINE: WASHINGTON, May 23
BODY:
The Pentagon has revised a draft of its post-cold-war strategy, dropping
language from an earlier document advocating the perpetuation of a
one-superpower world in which the United States would work to prevent the rise
of any "competitors" to its primacy in Western Europe and East Asia.
The new document, approved by Defense Secretary Dick Cheney on Friday,
sharpens the American commitment to collective military action as a "key
feature" of United States strategy and looks forward to the decline of military
investment as the principal means of balancing power among nations.
With far more diplomatic language than in an earlier draft, the new document
forsakes any goal of preventing the emergence of "any potential future global
competitor" and stresses the importance of strengthening international
organizations like the United Nations for resolving disputes.
Input From Cheney
The elimination of what was a dominant theme in the earlier draft reflects
high-level input from both Mr. Cheney and Gen. Colin L. Powell, chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, senior Pentagon officials said. The new language
represents a significant retrenchment and appears to have discredited the idea,
expressed in internal Administration foreign policy discussions, that the United
States should focus its energies on containing German and Japanese aspirations
for regional leadership.
The nearly final draft has been circulating in the Pentagon since April 16. A
copy was provided to The New York Times by an Administration official who
believes the debate on post-cold-war strategy should be conducted in public.
Earlier Draft Criticized
The earlier draft, dated Feb. 18, was roundly criticized in the White House
and in foreign capitals after its contents were disclosed in The New York Times
in March. Prepared under the supervision of the Pentagon's Under Secretary for
policy, Paul Wolfowitz, the earlier draft implied that a competing power or
alliance of nations, bolstered by surging economic strength in Germany or Japan,
could arise from these nations and eventually express their rivalry with America
through military competition.
To keep this from happening, the earlier draft proposed that the United
States build a new order based on "convincing potential competitors that they
need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect
their legitimate interests."
The new draft reflects an American foreign policy establishment far less
threatened by ascending roles for important allies, even leadership by those
allies when their interests are more directly affected. Yet a goal of the new
draft is to seek to preserve a leading American role in strategic deterrence and
regional alliances that will, by their demonstration of military cooperation,
deter hostile and non-democratic powers from seeking to dominate important
regions.
On Friday, Germany and France announced the formation of an all-European
military corps and invited other nations to join. The new security alliance
would work with NATO in crises where NATO'S 16 member nations declared an
interest, but would also respond independently in crises where NATO interests
were not involved.
The later Pentagon draft substantially softens the earlier document's
expressed opposition to emerging security alliances in Europe while also
emphasizing the need to preserve a key role for NATO, where American power and
influence have been pre-eminent.
Striking Change of Tone
With a striking change of tone, the later draft states, "One of the primary
tasks we face today in shaping the future is carrying longstanding alliances
into the new era, and turning old enmities into new cooperative relationships."
For the first time in the memory of military officials who have drafted
policy, the new draft states that while a strong defense to deter potential foes will continue to be an important concept in American security, a leveling
of military investment coupled with greater economic and security cooperation
will create a more stable world.
"It is not in our interest or those of the other democracies to return to
earlier periods in which multiple military powers balanced one another off in
what passed for security structures, while regional, or even global peace hung
in the balance," it said.
The new document places greater emphasis on international military
cooperation, with a special emphasis on cooperation with Russia, Ukraine and the
other republics of the former Soviet Union, as a means of providing "security at
lower costs with lower risks for all."
The document, known as the Defense Planning Guidance for the 1994-99 fiscal
years, has never been made public and parts of it are classified. It is a policy
that is an internal planning guide for the Pentagon and prepared every two
years. As such, it represents "guidance" from the President and the Secretary of
Defense to the four military services on how to prepare their budgets and forces
in the future.
Additional Refinements Made
A senior Pentagon official, commenting on the April 16 draft, said that it
"more carefully reflects" the thinking of Mr. Cheney, but that additional
refinements and editing changes have been made since that version was
circulated. He said the major elements remain.
Though Mr. Cheney signed the document Friday, it was not clear whether it
would be subject to additional comment or revision after circulating to the
White House and State Department.
The new draft continues to make the case for the Bush Administration's
concept of a "base force" military of 1.6 million uniformed troops and rejects
calls in Congress for a greater peace dividend that could be derived from deeper
military cuts. And while it strengthens the Administration's commitment to act
in concert with allies and through international bodies like the United Nations,
it preserves a commitment "to act independently, as necessary, to protect our
critical interests."
A central theme of the later draft, which echoes Mr. Cheney's and General
Powell's public testimony, is that a precipitous decline in military spending
could "break" the organizational competence of the American military and tempt
adversaries like Iraq to seek to dominate critical regions.
Commitment to Israel
The later draft also makes a specific commitment to the security of Israel
and to providing Taiwan with modern military equipment.
The later version of the planning document, like its predecessor, calls on
the four military services to be prepared to fight two major regional wars
simultaneously while maintaining sizable military presence in Europe, where the
old Soviet-led Warsaw Pact threat has disappeared.
"We must recognize what we are so often told by the leaders of the new
democracies -- that continued U.S. presence in Europe is an essential part of
the West's overall efforts to maintain stability even in the midst of such
dramatic change," it states.
Even with significant adjustments, the later draft is likely to have little
impact on the military services. The battle over the document's tone, emphasis
and language is more a struggle of ideas about the future of American foreign
policy and military strategy.
Potential Threats Reformulated
The later draft, in stating potential threats, retreats to a more narrow
formulation, which calls for the United States to prevent "any hostile power
from dominating a region critical to our interests." It adds that such
"consolidated, non-democratic control of the resources" in a region "could
generate a significant threat to our security."
The February draft had stated that while the United States could not become
the world's policeman in the future, "we will retain the pre-eminent
responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only
our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously
unsettle international relations."
The later draft abandons the broad sweep and unilateral tone of the earlier
draft and stresses a more narrow point that where possible, the United States
will act in concert and cooperation with allies, "but we must maintain the
capabilities for addressing selectively those security problems that threaten
our own interests."
A specific goal of restraining India's "hegemonic aspirations" in South Asia
also was dropped in the later draft in favor of language promoting a reduction
of tensions between India and Pakistan.
Some Fine Nuances
In some cases, the nuances of change in the new draft seem to draw
distinctions without a difference. For instance, the new document drops the
claim of an allied "victory" over the Soviet Union, a claim that former
President Mikhail S. Gorbachev had criticized after the earlier document was
made public. Instead, the new draft characterizes as a "great success" the
overall discrediting of Communism as an ideology and the collapse of the Soviet
empire.
But other changes in emphasis appeared to be driven by a more fundamental
recognition that in the post-cold-war era, diplomatic and economic tools will
become more effective instruments in international relations while military
tools will recede to a lower status.
"Our tools include political and economic measures and others such as
security assistance, military-to-military contacts, humanitarian aid and
intelligence assistance, as well as security measures to prevent the emergence
of a non-democratic aggressor in critical regions," the new draft states.
While the role of the United Nations was left unrecognized in the earlier
draft, it is prominently mentioned in the new document, which says, "In this
more secure international environment, there will be enhanced opportunities for
political, economic, environmental, social and security issues to be resolved
through new or revitalized international organizations, including the United
Nations, or regional arrangements."
GRAPHIC: Photos: The Pentagon has revised a draft of its post-cold-war strategy
in far more diplomatic language than in an earlier draft. The changes reflect
opinions from Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, left (Michael Geissinger for The
New York Times), and Gen. Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. (Associated Press) (pg. 14)
Chart: "Superpower Notion Gives Way to 'Collective' Approach"
Key Sections of Pentagon Document on Post-Cold-War Strategy
Initial Draft (Feb. 18, 1992)
1) Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either
on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on
the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is a dominant
consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we
endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources
would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to general global power.
2) The U.S. must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a
new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they
need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect
their legitimate interests. In non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently
for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from
challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and
economic order. We must maintain the mechanism for deterring potential
competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.
3) Like the coalition that opposed Iraqi aggression, we should expect future
coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies, often not lasting beyond the crisis being
confronted, and in many cases carrying only general agreement over the
objectives to be accomplished. Nevertheless, the sense that the world order is
ultimately backed by the U.S. will be an important stabilizing factor.
4) While the U.S. cannot become the world's policeman, by assuming
responsibility for righting every wrong, we will retain the preeminent
responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only
our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously
unsettle international relations.
5) We continue to recognize that collectively the conventional forces of the
states formerly comprising the Soviet Union retain the most military potential
in all of Eurasia; and we do not dismiss the risks to stability in Europe from a
nationalist backlash in Russia or efforts to reincorporate into Russia the newly
independent republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and possibly others....We must,
however, be mindful that democratic change in Russia is not irreversible, and
that despite its current travails, Russia will remain the strongest military
power in Eurasia and the only power in the world with the capability of
destroying the United States.
6) In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain
the predominant outside power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access
to the region's oil.
Latest Draft (April 16, 1992)
1) Our most fundamental goal is to deter or defeat attack from whatever
source. . .. The second goal is to strengthen and extend the system of defense
arrangements that binds democratic and like-minded nations together in common
defense against aggression, build habits of cooperation, avoid the
renationalization of security policies, and provide security at lower costs and
with lower risks for all. Our preference for a collective response to preclude threats or, if necessary, to deal with them is a key feature of our regional
defense strategy. The third goal is to preclude any hostile power from
dominating a region critical to our interests, and also thereby to strengthen
the barriers against the re-emergence of a global threat to the interests of the
U.S. and our allies.
2) One of the primary tasks we face today in shaping the future is carrying
long standing alliances into the new era, and turning old enmities into new
cooperative relationships. If we and other leading democracies continue to build
a democratic security community, a much safer world is likely to emerge. If we
act separately, many other problems could result.
3) Certain situations like the crisis leading to the Gulf War are likely to
engender ad hoc coalitions. We should plan to maximize the value of such
coalitions. This may include specialized roles for our forces as well as
developing cooperative practices with others.
4) While the United States cannot become the world's policeman and assume
responsibility for solving every international security problem, neither can we
allow our critical interests to depend solely on internation mechanisms that can
be blocked by countries whose interests may be very different than our own.
Where our allies interests are directly affected, we must expect them to take an appropriate share of the responsibility, and in some cases play the leading
role; but we maintain the capabilities for addressing selectively those security
problems that threaten our own interests.
5) The U.S. has a significant stake in promoting democratic consolidation
and peaceful relations between Russia, Ukraine and the other republics of the
former Soviet Union.
6) In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, we seek to foster regional
stability, deter aggression against our friends and interests in the region,
protect U.S. nationals and property, and safeguard our access to international
air and seaways and to the region's oil. The United States is committed to the
security of Israel and to maintaining the qualitative edge that is critical to
Israel's security. Israel's confidence in its security and U.S.-Israel strategic
cooperation contribute to the stability of the entire region, as demonstrated
once again during the Persian Gulf War. At the same time, our assistance to our
Arab friends to defend themselves against aggression also strengthens security
throughout the region, including for Israel. (pg. 14)