· The number one objective of U.S. post-Cold War political and
military strategy should be preventing the emergence of a rival
"Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival.
This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense
strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power
from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated
control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include
Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union,
and Southwest Asia.
"There are three additional aspects to this objective: First the U.S
must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order
that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they
need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture
to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense
areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced
industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership
or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order.
Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential
competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role."
· Another major U.S. objective should be to safeguard U.S. interests and promote American values.
According to the draft document, the U.S. should aim "to address
sources of regional conflict and instability in such a way as to
promote increasing respect for international law, limit international
violence, and encourage the spread of democratic forms of government
and open economic systems."
The draft outlines several scenarios in which U.S. interests could
be threatened by regional conflict: "access to vital raw materials,
primarily Persian Gulf oil; proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missiles, threats to U.S. citizens from
terrorism or regional or local conflict, and threats to U.S. society
from narcotics trafficking."
The draft relies on seven scenarios in potential trouble spots to
make its argument -- with the primary case studies being Iraq and North
· If necessary, the United States must be prepared to take unilateral action.
There is no mention in the draft document of taking collective action through the United Nations.
The document states that coalitions "hold considerable promise for
promoting collective action," but it also states the U.S. "should
expect future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies" formed to deal with a
particular crisis and which may not outlive the resolution of the
The document states that what is most important is "the sense that
the world order is ultimately backed by the U.S." and that "the United
States should be postured to act independently when collective action
cannot be orchestrated" or in a crisis that calls for quick response.